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Jerry Harp 
Fidelities to Form* 
Like countless other writers (some now well known but most of us residing, 
like the present writer, in some comfortable neighborhood of oblivion), I was 
fortunate to have Donald Justice as a teacher. This was at the University of 
Florida, in the last regular-semester writing workshop he would teach before 
his retirement. Reassuring, clear-eyed, somewhat detached (like a doctor at 
tending to a nervous patient), he conducted our workshop sessions with the 
kind manners and critical acumen he is deservedly known for. I suspect that 
his sagacity and manners transfigured our dread into something more like 
hope or confidence, if not in ourselves then in our decision to be there; we 
were in the right hands. Justice assured us of what we should do. He would 
give us no assignments because, since we had come to the writing program, 
he assumed that we would be reading and writing all the time. We should 
read poetry in English from all centuries available. We should read poetry in 
other languages (in the original if possible, if not then in translation) from at 
least the last two centuries. He gave us a long handout demonstrating an array 
of verse forms. Throughout the semester he would drop words of advice into 
our discussions, words of deceptive simplicity. To this day much of what he 
said is still unfolding itself to me. 
Such is the voice that we encounter in Justice's Oblivion: On Writers and 
Writing. Here is a true expert in the tools, techniques, and forms of his craft or 
art. The word "form" in this context calls for some explanation. Were I 
simply to assert that Justice, in his critical writing as in his poetic practice, is a 
master of meter and rhyme, I would only be stating what virtually every 
reader of contemporary poetry must already know. I should like to focus on 
Justice's treatment of "form" in the multiple senses in which he uses the term, 
which touch on, besides the most specific, technical details of a work, its 
style, tone, and vision?the many characteristics that go to make up its life. As 
Justice points out in his essay "Benign Obscurity," the particular kinds of 
difficult writing he focuses on?the twisting of Hopkins's "Spelt from Sybil's 
*Oblivion: On Writers and Writing, Donald Justice, Story Line Press, 1998, 135 pages, $14. 
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Leaves," that seems to refer "to some general mood-center"; the plain lan 
guage only hinting at a predicament "based on a classic story situation" of E. 
A. Robinson's "Eros Turannos"?are examples of "what, without reference 
to the meters and the rhyming, we ought to be willing to call form." 
Yet another sense of "form" comes into play in the volume's opening 
essay, "Baudelaire: the Question of His Sincerity; or Variations on Several 
Texts by Eliot," in which Justice defines Baudelaire's "sincerity" as "fidelity 
to form." In this context "form" refers to the poet's characteristic pose or 
persona, which in Baudelaire's case is constituted by a coupling of the "para 
phernalia of decadence" with a "high moral tone." Fidelity to form consists, 
then, in "saying what the form obliges you to say regardless of whether or not 
you believe in it." Fidelity does not end here, however, for Justice adds a 
further and characteristic note of restraint to the formal discipline, the will 
ingness "to espouse what you have felt obliged to say?or to keep decently 
silent." He then offers "a more humane version" of fidelity to form: "discov 
ering what you mean by or in the act of saying it." Fidelity to form thus 
functions for the writer as both a method of invention and a mode of devel 
opment. 
In other essays in this volume, Justice writes of Philip Larkin's voice that is 
by turns brutal and sentimental, a mingling of mordant wit with notes of 
"plangent bitterness or regret"; and he pays tribute to Weldon Kees, "origi 
nal in one of the few ways that matter: he speaks to us in a voice or, rather, 
in a particular tone of voice which we have never heard before." Kees, who 
Justice hears as "calm in the face of a certain doom," also appears in "Oblivion: 
Variations on a Theme," where he is joined by "the elegant and cool ex 
ample" of Henri Coulette, and Robert Boardman Vaughn who was capable in 
a few all-but-forgotten poems of "great beauty of a certain high romantic 
kind." (Justice has edited the poems of both Kees and Coulette and has made 
Vaughn the subject of several of his own poems.) 
Much of the poignance of "Oblivion: Variations on a Theme" arises from 
the combination of Justice's sense of the life of the artist as a vocation, with 
his sense of the tenuousness "of notoriety and riches and such toys." Justice is 
very much in earnest that the dedication of one's life to art is a kind of 
vocation: "The vows may not be codified and published, but they are secretly 
known and one does take them. I am perfectly serious about this." While 
Justice claims a "romantic view" of this moment of dedication, his restraint 
and commitment to formal disciplines will lead some to consider him a clas 
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sicist. Actually, the example of Justice's work (both his literary criticism and 
his poetry) is among the best to point out the inadequacy of the old di 
chotomy between classicists and romantics. His is not a commitment to a set 
of calcified forms; Dana Gioia has called him a "postmodern classicist," one 
whose commitment is to a sense of tradition on the move, a tradition of forms 
that encourage and lend themselves to constant revision, experimentation, 
and invention. 
No doubt, Justice's flexible definition of form fits well with this dynamic 
sense of tradition. It is important to remember, though, that part of what 
Justice means by form is the discipline of the line, including the iambic pen 
tameter line, which "comes trailing" its "tradition and precedent." Yet here 
too the emphasis is on variation. The line is the basic material that the artist 
works with, shapes, and rearranges. This is the conception of the line that 
emerges in "The Invention of Free Verse," which features Ezra Pound, in 
Wabash, Indiana, in 1907, inventing twentieth-century free verse in writing 
his poem "Cino," tightening up the iambic line by removing unstressed syl 
lables: "... if two stresses could be brought together, why not three? From 
'Ravens, nights, allurement' only let the slack syllables be dropped," and the 
experiment yields the line, '"Eyes, dreams, lips, and the night goes.'" Thus 
did the breaking of the iamb open the poetic line for further experimentation. 
Justice's most fully developed essay on prosody, "The Free-Verse Line in 
Stevens," demonstrates how marvelous an essay on such a topic can be when 
approached by someone of his depth of understanding. Justice articulates in 
detail the ways in which Stevens worked with the materials at his disposal, 
yielding two basic kinds of free-verse line: a relatively short, syntactically 
shaped, accentual line ("Disillusionment of Ten O'clock," "The American 
Sublime"); and a longer line that develops out of the old heroic line by way 
of a 
"general loosening process," for the most part through the substitution of 
anapestic feet for iambic feet, and the variation of line length within a poem 
("Esth?tique du Mal," "The World as Meditation," "Prologues to What is 
Possible"). 
It is also worth mentioning Justice's treatment of the line in his apprecia 
tion, for its "purity of style," of William Carlos Williams's "Between Walls." 
This poem shows, in what is perhaps as close as one can come to an unadul 
terated instance, a particular conception of the line taken to an extreme?a 
short line broken across syntax, producing a "lean" and "streamlined" poem 
that focuses on objects and the relationships the poet sees among them, creat 
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ing something that approaches a photographic effect. Of further note in this 
essay is the way the commentary on the structure of the line becomes also a 
commentary on the subject matter and effect of the poem. These different 
"parts" of the poem work together, as the various senses of the word "form" 
converge in the particular work. This is not to say, however, that Justice 
indulges in the old fantasy of organic form?far from it. What he offers in 
stead is his understanding of the dynamic workings of "the technology of 
verse," the made thing that poetry is?something that exists "at that remove 
from life which traditionally we have called art." Someone far wiser than I 
has said that it is natural for human beings to be artificial. We are makers, and 
what we make demands "artifice" or "skill" (in Greek tekhne, the root of our 
word technology). While this artificiality has the effect of distancing one from 
the human lifeworld, it also doubles back on the human lifeworld to make it 
richer. As Justice writes, one motive for the technology of verse, and in fact 
"for much if not all art" is "to keep memorable what deserves to be remem 
bered." 
Justice's intimate knowledge of and experience with the technical work 
ings of language enable him to isolate and discuss very subtle verbal effects. 
For example, in "The Prose Sublime" he analyzes what it is about some prose 
of a relatively plain kind (as distinct from purple prose or prose of a self 
consciously experimental kind) that makes it successful in producing the kind 
of 
"pleasure of the very kind to which poetry is normally thought to have first 
claim." One kind of prose sublime, illustrated by a passage from Hemingway, 
creates a sense that great care is being taken in the writing, such that the 
presence of the author is felt "in the weight of the words picked out and the 
rhythms of the composed and modeled phrases." Of course, the same ought 
to be said of Justice's prose. Like his poems, his essays are characterized by a 
startlingly precise modulation of tone and astute handling of subtle ideas. 
Such care and precision comes across, for example, in his commentary fol 
lowing up John Crowe Ransom's refutation of the rather clumsy notion of 
imitative sound effects in poetry, a notion that becomes strained very quickly, 
especially when the sounds are claimed to suggest something other than sound, 
such as spaciousness, softness, or bewilderment. While Justice agrees with 
Ransom's critique, he follows with reflections that show his characteristic 
sensitivity to the materials of his art: 
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And yet there is something in all this imagined correspondence of 
sound and sense, even though for the most part, when examined in 
bald detail, it is clearly naive and unrealistic, based on the sort of 
simple faith poets are not backward in encouraging, that they are 
wizards of the language, in control of matters more properly as 
cribed to chance. 
In this sentence the neat and expected dichotomies (correspondence / dispar 
ity; wizardly control / sheer chance) break open, hinting at how the opposed 
terms intersect, or perhaps at how neither term quite applies, allowing subtler 
notions to emerge. The opening "And yet perhaps," with its multiple warn 
ings, puts us on notice that we are entering into some difficult terrain and that 
we who enter should abandon naivete. Whatever the as-yet-unnamed "some 
thing" is that we are to encounter here, we know that we shall not encounter 
the "naive and unrealistic" version of it. At the same time, we may realize 
that if poets are "not backward in encouraging" the notion of verbal wiz 
ardry, neither should they be forward in encouraging it (otherwise there would 
be no need for the litotes just quoted). And yet there is something to the idea; 
even if the bald notion of such wizardry is clearly naive, it would seem that an 
outright dismissal of it is naive as well. Perhaps the wizardry occurs precisely 
when the poet takes advantage of chance, so that control and chance occur 
together. Similarly, the dichotomy concerning imitation yields to something 
subtler, a kind of congruence perhaps, something like the congruence that 
Justice refers to in his essay on Philip Larkin's poem "Coming." Justice points 
out that the repetition that occurs in lines ten and eleven in "Coming" ("It 
will be spring soon, / It will be spring soon?") "exerts some odd slight 
power." While Justice reminds his reader that he is "constitutionally suspi 
cious" of imitative sound effects in poems, he also points out that once he lets 
his guard down, he sees "what should have been obvious from the start and 
doubtless has always been so to others. The repeated line is an imitation of the 
thrush's song, faint perhaps, as all such imitative effects are, but true. Not that 
it intends, of course, to reproduce the actual sounds of the bird's song, but 
only to stand in for it in a poem by way of a familiar but unexpressed conven 
tion." We get to the moment of congruence by way of the artifice of conven 
tion. 
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Donald Justice is a maker* who brings vast experience to the art of the 
essays collected here. Much of what I find amazing about this book is how, 
without arrogance but with consistent insight and discernment, Justice main 
tains a dialogue with so many of the figures who have formed our critical 
heritage, from Longinus to Coleridge to Eliot and Ransom and Blackmur. 
While Justice is aware of contemporary trends in literary theory and critical 
practice, he is not bound by them. Rather, he takes up discussion of what he 
finds important. I'm convinced we shall do well to listen. 
* It is worth noting that besides writing poetry and essays, Justice writes short fiction, com 
poses music, and paints. In fact, the painting on the cover of Oblivion is one of the author's 
own, though the colors have been rather strikingly altered; for example, what is an expanse 
of burnt orange on the book cover, is a vivid yellow in the original painting. It should also 
be noted that the portrait of the author on the back cover of the book is not, as it is listed, a 
self-portrait; rather, it is a portrait of the author by the artist Dee Clark. 
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